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COMMUNITY PROPERTY STATUS OF INCOME FROM
BUSINESS -INVOLVING PERSONAL SERVICES
AND SEPARATE CAPITAL
F. A. LESouaD*
I.
SCOPE OF PROBLEM
S TILL uncertain in many community property states after a half. century
of litigation is the community or separate status of income derived by
the husband or wife from a business involving personal services and
separate capital.
Typical is John Jones, who owns a comer grocery store in Seattle, Wash-
ington. After becoming well established, he takes unto 'himself a wife-little
knowing that he is also acquiring a community property and income tax
headache. At the time of marriage, he has a substantial investment in iven-
tory, receivables and equipment. The business continues after marriage, taking
all hIs time. It is successful, and the income grows through the years. Is this
income community or separate property?
Jones would have the same problem if he were operating any merchan-
dising, brokerage, manufacturing or like business. And the answer to this
question may have not only important property consequences under state
laws but also substantial tax consequences under federal' laws.
This problem applies in full force only in the states of Arizona, California,
Nevada, New Mexico and Washington. In these states, the original com-
munity property system as established under the French and Spanish law,
to the effect that rents, issues and profits of separate property belong to the
community, have been modified by statutes providing that rents, issues and
profits of separate property are separate.2 Idaho, Louisiana, Oklahoma and
Texas have retained, in essence, the original community property system
(although with modifications), and it follows in those states that income from
*LeSourd, F'. A., L.L.B. University of Washington, 1982; member of the law
firm of Little, Leader, LeSourd and Palmer, Seattle; former special assistant In tax
matters to the Attorney General of the United States.
1 FuUer v. Ferguson, 26 CaL 547 '(1864).
2Arizona: Az. CODE ANN. (1939) § 63-302; California: CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 162,
163; Nevada: NEv. CoMe. STAT. (1929) § 3355; New Mexico: N. M. STAT, ANN.
(1941) § 65-304 and 305; Washmgton: REvi. REV. STAT. §9 6890, 6891.
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a business conducted after marriage belongs to the community even though
the business is operated on separate capital of the husband.'
While the income arising from separate property in the states first named
constitutes separate property, nevertheless, the income arising from the
personal time or efforts of the husband or wife constitutes community prop-
erty 4 Where the husband personally operates a business in which his separate
capital is invested, the problem of determining the status of the income is,
therefore, perplexing.
II.
HOW PROBLEM AROSE
To appreciate the underlying conflicts affecting this question, one may
well examine the process by which these states abandoned the French and
Spanish system of giving the community the income from separate property
The first of these states to set up its community property system was Cali-
forma. By Section 9 of the Act of 1850, the California Legislature followed the
ancient community property system and provided that the rents and profits
of separate property of either husband or wife should be deemed common
property. But in 1860, in George v. Ransom, this statute was held uncon-
stitutional insofar as the wife's separate property was concerned. The Cali-
fornra Constitution provided that property owned by the wife before marriage
and acquired by gift, devise or descent thereafter should be separate and the
Supreme Court held that the framers of the Constitution must have had in
mind the meaning of "separate property" at common law. Since at common
8 Idaho: IDAHO CODE Axw. (1932) § 31-907; Louisiana: LA. CIV. CODE Art. 2402;
Oklahoma: Session Laws 1945, Title 32, § 1, 2, 3, p. 118. The original Oklahoma
community property law of 1941 had included as separate property the increase
of separate property. OKLA. STAT. (1941) Title 32, §§ 53, 54. This was repealed
in 1945. Texas: Tax CONST. (1876) Art. XVI, § 15. Frame v. Frame, 120 Tex.
61, 36 S. W (2d) 152, 73 A. L. R. 1512 (1931) However, in Texas, increase in
value of separate property is separate. VEaxoN's Am. Civ. STAT. Arts. 4613, 4614.
See long list of Texas cases cited in O'Connor v Comm. (C. C. A. 5th, 1940)
110 F (2d) 652. The problem discussed in this article could be applicable to
such increase.
Some of these states have qualifications in the case of separate property of
the wife. See statutes and decisions cited.
'Arizona: Garver v. Thoman, 15 Ariz. 38, 135 Pac. 724 (1913), Rundle v.
'Winters, 38 Ariz. 239, 298 Pac. 929 (1931), In re Torrey's Estate, 54 Ariz. 369,
'95 P (2d) 990 (1939) Califorma: McDuff v. McDuff, 32 Cal. App. 552, 191 Pac.
a57 (1920), Pereira v Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103 Pac. 488 (1909), Estate of Gold, 170
Cal. 621, 151 Pac. 12 (1915) Nevada: Lake v. Lake, 18 Nev. 361, 4 Pac. 711, 7 Pac.
74 (1884) See also Barrett v. Franke, 46 Nev. 170, 208 Pac. 435 (1922) New
Mexico: Katson v. Katson, 43 N. M. 214, 89 P (2d) 524 (1939) Washington:
Jacobs v. Hoitt, 119 Wash. 283, 205 Pac. 414 (1922) In re Hebert's Estate, 169
Wash. 402, 14 P (2d) 6 (1932) Federal: Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101, 75 L. Ed.
239, 51 S. Ct. 58; George W VanVorst, 7 T. C. 826 (1946)
5 15 Cal. 322, 76 Am. Dec. 490 (1860)
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law the wife was entitled to the income on her own separate property, since
the framers of the Constitution were more familiar with common law, and
since the purpose of adopting the community property system, as the Court
states, was to protect the wife from the improvidence of the husband, the
Court concludes the framers of the Constitution must have intended the
profits from the wife's separate property to be separate.
That tls decision applied only to separate property of the wife, and that
the statute was constitutional as applied to the husband was indicated the
next year by Lews v. Lews, where increase in separate livestock of the
husband was held to belong to the community Income from the wife's sep-
arate property was, therefore, separate and income from the husband's
community. This contradictory treatment m California was ended in 1872
by the enactment of legislation making separate the income of the separate
property of both husband and wife.7
The ongmal Washington community property law passed in 18698 did not
directly set forth the status of rents, issues and profits of separate property
The amendatory act of 18719 followed the French and Spanish system, and
provided that the income from separate property should be common prop-
erty. However, this was left out of the 1873 act10 and in 1879 the law was
.amended to adopt the California rule that income from separate property was
separate.2
Arizona's original community property law provided that the rents and
profits of separate property should be community 1 However, the Supreme
Court of Arizona held, quoting from George v. Ransom, that a later act's
givmg a marred woman exclusive control of her separate property, gave to
her as separate property the income from her separate property.' Later, ihe
legislature provided that the income from separate property of both husband
and wife should be separate.15
Nevada and New Mexico adopted systems modeled primarily on the Cali-
forma law and with it the California construction that the rents, issues and
profits of separate property are separate.
618 Cal. 654 (1861)
4 CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 162, 163.8 Wash. Session Laws 1869, p. 318.
9 Wash, Session Laws 1871, p. 67, § 2.10 Wash. Session Laws 1873, p. 450.
12 Wash. Session Laws 1879, p. 77, § 1.
22 Arzona, Act of 1865, § 9.
' Arizona, Act of 1871.
21 Charauleau v. Woffenden, 1 Arz. 243, 25 Pac. 652 (1876)
23 ARIs. CODE ANN. (1939) § 63-302.
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The California doctrine as announced in George v. Ransom resulted in a
hybrid community property system in these five states and brought into
being the problem here discussed."8
III.
EARLY ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE PROBLEM
Fundamentally, it may properly be said that this hybrid system arose out
of the desire to protect the rights of women that was basic in the psychology
of the pioneer West. Not only did this Western psychology create this problem
of segregation of community and separate income, but also it influenced the
early attempts to solve the problem. In 1864, in Lewis v. Johns,," the husband
was farming the wife's separate land, and the question was whether the
community was entitled to any part of the proceeds by reason of the hus-
band's services. Stating that the Constitution and decisions of California
afforded a shield to the separate property of the wife and the profit thereof,
the court held that the husband cannot, by his act, acquire an ,interest m the
wife's separate property or its increase. Also typical of these early decisions
is Dtefendorff v. Hopkins,"" where the wife ran a separately owned boarding
house. The California court held that although personal labor was involved,
nevertheless, personal labor would in some degree be involved in all rents,
issues and profits of separate property and this was no reason to change the
rule that the income was separate.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Washington, in the period from 1895 to
1921 repeatedly held that the community derived no income by reason of
the services of the spouses in a business based on separate capital.'
All this was very well in protecting the wife, but like so many other
principles, it produced results which threatened to nullify the very objective
sought to be obtained. Where the husband had separate property and devoted
all his time to it, was the wife thereby to be deprived of any community
income? An early case which was extreme on this point, Lake v. Lake, came
to the Supreme Court of Nevada in 1884.20 There the husband and wife both
18DEFNIAK, 1 P=ICIPLES OF COMMUITY PROPERTY § 71, note 50, attrib-
utes this result to the view on the part of the court that the entire community
property was subject to the separate debts of the husband, and a desire to pro-
tect the wife from the husband's creditors.
1 24 Cal. 99, 85 Am. Dec. 49 (1864)
's 28 Pac. 265, 95 Cal. 343 (1891)
19 Leake v. Hayes, 13 Wash. 213, 43 Pac. 48 (1895), Brookman v. State Insur-
ance Co., 18 Wash. 308, 51 Pac. 395 (1897), Hester v. Stine, 46 Wash. 469, 90 Pac.
594 (1907), Merrick v. Appenzeller, 115 Wash. 181, 196 Pac. 629 (1921)
20 18 Nev. 361, 4 Pac. 711 (1884), On rehearing reported as Lake v Bender,
7 Pac. 74 (1885)
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devoted full time to the operation of a hotel owned separately, by the husband.
Faithful to the letter of the rule that had been established, the court held
that all of the income was-the separate property of the husband. Thus the
wife was deprived of not only the benefit of the husband's services but also
the benefit of her own services.
In Washington, too, the theory of the early cases giving the wife separately
all income from a business conducted on her separate capital, despite personal
services rendered by her, caused the court m 1901 in Austin v. Clifford 2 to
hold that no community property arose from the business of the husband in
buying and selling property where the capital was originally his separate
property 22
Criticism was bound to follow this extension of George v. Ransom28 achiev-
mg a result so contrary to the basic premise of protection of rights of women,
still a vital psychology in the West in the first quarter of this century In
1907, F T. Post of the Washington bar attacked the Austin case on the
ground that it enabled the husband to avoid accumulation of community
property.2 4 The courts, while continuing to give lip service to the old rule,
began finding ways and means to give the community an interest in the
profits from separate property where services were involved. The California
Supreme Court permitted a creditor of the husband to reach a crop of barley
raised on land leased by the wife.2 5 The Supreme Court of Washington in
1904, citing Texas cases, gave the community a lien against separate real
estate for the increase in value thereof resulting from the joint efforts of the
spouses.26 Even in the drastic case of Lake v. Lake2" the Nevada court stated
as dictum that if it were apparent that the profits came principally from the
joint efforts of the husband and wife, they would be community As early as
1892 the Washington court referred to the fact that the energy and skill of
,124 Wash. 172, 64 Pac. 155 (1901)
S2 Cf. Estate of Higgms, 65 Cal. 407, 4 Pac. 389 (1884), Bauer's Estate, 79 Cal.
304, 21 Pac. 759 (1889); Re Peppers Estate, 158 Cal. 619, 112 Pac. 62, 31 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 1092 (1910); Lennmger v. Lennmger, 167 Cal. 297, 139 Pac. 679 (1914);
Seeber v. Randall (C. C. A. 9th, 1900) 102 Fed. 215.
23 Supra note 5.
2' PROCEEDias OF W.SHmGTON STATE BAR ASSOCrATioN, 1907.
25 Davis v. Green, 122 Cal. 364, 55 Pac. 9 (1898) Cf. Hester v. Stine, 46 Wash.
469, 90 Pac. 594 (1907), where the Washington court refused to let a creditor of
the husband reach a crop of barley on the wife's land because the wife con-
ducted the farming herself and the husband was most of the time absent from
the state.
26 Legg v. Legg, 34 Wash. 132, 75 Pac. 130 (1904)
2- Supra note 20.
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a spouse was a contributing factor to the production of the income as support
for an extension of the rights of the community 28
During these early days there was much confusion and uncertainty caused,
in the writer's opinion, by the fact that most of the judges were educated
in the common law and had an imperfect understanding of the civil law
background of community property Slow to develop, for example, was a
clear comprehension that the value of services of the spouses belonged to the
community even where devoted to separate property 29
IV
CALIFORNIA SOLUTION: THE PEREIRA FORMULA
In 1909 the divorce case of Pereira v. Pereira° came before the California
courts. The husband there operated a saloon business. His original capital
therein, $15,500, had been separate property The lower court, seeking as
usual to protect the wife, held that all the income from the business was
community property Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of California stated
that there should be an apportionment to be determined from all the circum-
stances of the case, and that the separate capital with which he had com-
menced business should have resulted in separate income at least to the
extent of interest on a well secured loan, citing the West Virginia case of
Baggess v. Richards, Adm'r '
It is interesting that the first case in the community property states to
attempt to segregate the income into part community and part separate relied
on common law principles. Boggess v. Richards, Adm'r was a case where
a husband in a common law state devoted his labor to his wife's property
The court said that equity would protect creditors of the husband from what
was, in effect, a fraudulent conveyance and that the only way to ascertain
how much of the profit was due to the labor of the husband was to deduct
from the profit legal interest on the amount of capital invested.
California has, in the main, continued to follow the Pereira formulaY.3
However, the California courts have not applied the formula to cases revolv-
ing management of separate property as distinguished from the conduct of an
active business. Where the spouse spends full or part time buying, selling,
Yesler v Hochstettler, 4 Wash. 349, 30 Pac. 378 (1892)
9 cf. Lake v. Lake, supra note 20; Hester v. Stine, 46 Wash. 469, 90 Pac. 594
(1907)
:0 156 Cal. 1, 103 Pac. 488 (1909)
1139 W Va. 576, 20 S. E. 599, 26 L. R. A. 537 (1894)
11 Estate of Caswell, 105 Cal. App. 475, 288 Pac. 102 (1930); Estate of Mc-
Carthy, 127 Cal. App. 80, 15 P (2d) 223 (1932) Cf. Estate of Gold, 170 Cal. 621,
151 Pac. 12 (1915) where approval is dictum since all profits there were found
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improving, renting or otherwise managing separate property, all income is
separate.3s And even in some cases where the Pereira formula would seem
entirely applicable, the California courts have failed to apply it.8'
Arizona appears to hold that the income is all community or all separate,
depending on whether services or separate capital is the principal factor.8 '
The New Mexico court has suggested that the reasonable value of the services
be given to the community and the balance of the income be set apart as
separate property s
V
WASHINGTON SOLUTION: COMMINGLING
In Washington, the Supreme Court, without overruling its earlier decisions,
has gone the entire way from its previous rule that all the income is separate
to the present rule that all the income is community 8 7 Only once in this
progress of complete reversal did the court stop at the intermediate ground
of apportionment of the income. This was in 1922 in Jacobs v. HoiWt. 8"
Pereira v. Pereira and its formula were not mentioned and the Washington
to have resulted from services, %.e., gambling, and awarded to the community;
In re Fellow's Estate, 106 Cal. App. 681, 289 Pac. 887 (1930), where approval is
dictum since the court found that no definite separate capital had been estab-
lished.
The Pereira formula has been both supported (14 CALIF. L. REv. 402) and
criticized (Alvin E. Evans in 10 CAmn'. L. REv. 271, 282) by California com-
mentators.
"In re Barnes Estate, 128 Cal. App. 489, 17 P (2d) 1048 (1932), where this
distinction is expressly made. Cf, Cline v. Cline, 4 Cal. App. (2d) 626, 41 P (2d)
588 (1935)
The distinction between managing a business and managing one's property
is-hard to follow in many cases. For example, see Fuller v. Harwell, 117 Cal.
App. 280, 3 P.(2d) 592 (1931) where the wife under this doctrine was given
all of the cattle and hogs in what appears to be a full scale livestock and dairy
business commenced with her separate capital.
It is possible that this exception to Pereira v. Pereira has been abandoned in
California. See Witaschek v. Witaschek, 56 Cal. App.(2d) 277, 132 P (2d) 600
(1942), where the Court of Appeal sustained an apportionment of profits arising
from the husband's activities in managing his separate investments. The appor-
tionment is not shown to have strictly followed the Pereira formula, however.
8, Gray v. Perlis, 76 Cal. App. 511, 245 Pac. 221 (1926); Seligman v. Seligman,
85 Cal. App. 683, 259 Pac. 984 (1927); Estate of Pepper, 158 Cal. 619, 112 Pac.
62 (1910)
"Rundle v. Winters, 38 Ariz. 239, 298 Pac. 929 (1931); In re Torrey's Estate,
54 Ariz.'89, 95 P (2d) 990 (1939); cf. Lincoln Fire Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Barnes, 53
Ariz. 264, 88 P. (2d) 533 (1939)
20 Katson v. Katson, 43 N. M. 214, 89 P (2d) 524 (1939)
37 Compare, for example, I n re Witte's Estate, 21 Wn. (2d) 112, 150 P (2d)
595 (1944), with Leake v. Hayes, Austin v. Clifford; -and Hester v. Stine, all
supra notes 19 and 21.
"" 119 Wash. 283, 205 Pac. 414 (1922)
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court, with a method of apportionment not too clear in the opinion, sought
to do equity in accordance with the facts of the case.
As enunciated dearly by the more recent decisions, the Washington court
now holds that where personal services (which belong to the community) are
devoted to a business involving separate capital, there has been.a commingling
unless the parties contemporaneously themselves segregate the income. The
court further holds that community and separate income having been com-
mingled, all the income belongs to the community 9 unless the community
property is inconsiderable in comparison with the separate property, in which
event it is all separate.40 A further qualification has been made, that if with-
drawals for community expenses exceed the value of the services renderd by
the spouses, then the remainder is separate property 41
VI.
NEITHER CALIFORNIA NOR WASHINGTON RULE IS EQUITABLE
Behind the adoption of the Washington rule appears to be the feeling that
no practical basis of apportionment is available, and the court will not ven-
ture into such a speculative field. In reality, then, the Washington rule is an
avoidance of the problem. One could argue in support of this rule on the
ground that it gives more certainty were it not for the fact that it leaves
entirely uncertain the question of when the community services are mcon-
siderable in comparison with the separate capital.
The Washington rule is basically not equitable. Where the community
services are substantial and all income goes to the community, the spouse gets
nothing for Ins contribution of separate capital. And where the court gives
all income to the separate capital because the community services are small
compared to the separate capital, the community gets nothing for the services
rendered. A practical case with which the author is familiar is where a man
in the business of buying and selling for his own account real estate and other
investments is married. He devotes his full time to the business, but it might
be said that the value of his services is small in comparison with the large
amounts of separate capital which he had in the business at the time of mar-
riage. Should the court so hold, and thus treat all income as separate, he
89 In re Buchanan's Estate, 89 Wash. 172 154 Pac. 129 (1916); Salisbury v.
Meeker, 152 Wash. 146, 277 Pac. 376 (1929); E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc.
v. Garrison, 13 Wn. (2d) 170, 124 P (2d) 939, 17 WASH. L. Rsv. 221 (1942); In re
Witte's Estate, 21 Wn. (2d) 112, 150 P (2d) 595 (1944), cf. In re Binges Estate, 5
Wn.(2d) 446, 105 P (2d) 689 (1940)
4O In re Witte's Estate, supra note 39; cf. In re Binge's Estate, stupm note 39.
State ex rel. Van Moss v. Sailors, 180 Wash. 269, 39 P (2d) 397 (1934) Also
see note 60 infra for cases holding that when a salary is taken from the business
the balance of income is separate.
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could spend a lifetime devoting his full time to a very profitable business
and never accumulate any community property Conversely, if the court held
that lus services were substantial and that all income was community, he
would be deprived entirely of any separate income from the large amount
of separate property held by him at the time of marriage.
Nor is the California rule free from possible inequity The Pereira case
gives the separate property a return equal to interest on a long term debt,
and the balance goes to the community. Where earnings are large, the com-
munity may get a return far exceeding the reasonable value of the services,
while the separate property, which may be a substantial contributing cause
of the large income, is left with nothing more than interest. On the other
hand, if the income is small, all of it may go to the separate property as
interest and the community services go unrewarded.
VII.
FEDERAL TAX FORKMULA. G. C. M. 1030
The states, then, being in conflict on the status of income from a business
involving community services and separate capital, how has the Federal
Government treated it m administering its tax laws?
This question, of course, is of frequent and substantial importance with
regard both to federal income and estate tax. 2 On its solution depends the
splitting of income or estate between husband and wife, thus achieving lower
tax brackets.
As is to be expected on a point on wich the state courts, themselves, are
not in agreement, the rulings of the Bureau of Internal Revenue have not
been entirely consistent. In the first formal ruling on the question, Solicitors
Memorandum 3883,48 the Solicitor of Internal Revenue in 1925 was asked
to determine the status of earnings in Arizona of a husband who operated
after marriage an automobile agency which he had started before marriage.
The memorandum discusses the Arizona, California and Washington cases, btlt
insofar as the Washington decisions are concerned, cites only the early cases
(now apparently not followed), that the labor of a spouse on separate prop-
erty did not give the community any interest in the proceeds. These Wash-
ington cases he rejected, adopting the rule of Pereira . Pere ra," treating
"
2 The Federal Estate Tax importance of the question has been narrowed by
the 1942 estate tax amendments. See Fernandez v. Wiener, 325 U. S. 118, 90 L. Ed.
Adv. Op. 147 (1945), 66 Sup. Ct. Adv. Op. 179. But the problem remains in deter-
mining source of funds under those amendments.
4a IV, 2 Cum Buw. 125.
"See note 30 supra.
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as separate income interest on the separate capital and treating the balance
of the income as belonging to the community
In 1927, possibly concerned over the large tax savings in the states involved,
the Bureau of Internal Revenue reconsidered the matter. Reconsideration,
however, was limited to Arizona and Washington. California remained under
S. M. 3883 because of the specific decisions of her courts as to the method
of apportionment. The reconsideration resulted in the issuance of General
Counsel's Memorandum 1030," stating that where the income was essentially
attributable to the separate property it was separate; where it was essentially
attributable to services of one of the spouses it was community; but where
both were essential factors in producing the income an apportionment should
be attempted, in accordance with what each in fact contributed to the success
of the enterprise. A general method suggested was to segregate the income m
the proportion which a fair return on the separate investment bears to the
fair value of the personal services involved.
Of course this left the situation uncertain as far as Arizona and Washington
were concerned and put them in a different position from California. More-
over, the formula suggested in G. C. M. 1030 was generally more favorable
to the Bureau of Internal Revenue than that suggested in S. M. 3883, since
the former allocated to separate property some of the income above the
interest on the separate capital, while the latter gave to the community (and
consequently permitted the division between husband and wife on income
tax returns) all income above the usual interest on the separate capital. It
is not, therefore, surprising that in 1931 there appeared G. C. M. 9825"6
ignoring the differences 'between California and Washington decisions and
applying the more favorable (to the government) rule of G. C. M. 1030 to a
California case. This made it appear that the formula of G. C. M. 1030 was
the Bureau of Internal Revenue policy for all of the states dealt with by
this article. G. C. M. 9825 also suggested that a fair return on separate
capital under the formula of G. C. M. 1030 would be "usual interest" on
the separate capital. Whether this meant legal interest or usual commercial
rates of interest was not made clear. Determination of the reasonable value
of husband's services, the other factor in the formula, was apparently left
as a question of fact in each case.
There have been no further formal rulings since 1931 and subsequent
Bureau of Internal Revenue policy is disclosed only in administrative -ettle-
ments and positions taken in litigated cases. This policy has not been con-
46 VI, 1 Cumw. BuLL. 26.
16 X, 2 Cumv. BuLL. 146.
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sistent. In some cases the Commnissioner of Internal Revenue has argued for
his formula'0 7 and in others, where it did not work out to the government's
advantage, he has argued against it. 8 Also, the writer is unofficially advised
that some cases in the State of Washington have been adminstratively settled
on the basis of the Washington Supreme.Court decisions, viz: giving all the
income to the community.
The Tax Court has been much more consistent in following G. C. M. 1030
than has the Bureau itself, and the formula appears to be the settled policy
of that court.49 One exception was the case of Lawrence Oliver,' ansing
from California where the Tax Court followed the Peretra case and gave the
community all the income over and above usual interest on the separate
capital investment. No mention is made of the several Tax Court decisions
applying the different formula of G. C. M. 1030.
VII.
CONFLICT OF FEDERAL AND STATE RULES: THE TODD CASE
In the very same year that the Tax Court in the Oliver case applied the
California formula, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit m
Todd v. Commssoner of Internal Revenue" approved an earlier Tax Court
ruling rejecting the California formula and applying the formula of G. C. M.
1030. Two of the three circuit court judges held that in spite of the Cali-
forma rule as enunciated in the Peretra and other cases, to the effect that
the community should receive all income above usual interest on separate
capital, it was the duty of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to determine
from the facts of the case the amount of the return on the separate capital.
The commissioner's method, they said, is a rational one, is supported by
evidence, and the burden of showing error in the determination is on the
taxpayer. One judge dissented on the ground that the commissioner's deter-
mination cannot block inquiry into legal defects of the commissioner's action,
The case was finally remanded per curam for further evidence and in-
dependent action by the Tax Court.
4TJ. Z. Todd, 3 T. C. 643 (1944), (remanded by C. C. A. 9th in 153 F.(2d) 553(1945); see J. Z. Todd, 7 T. C. 399)
'
8 Cecil Gray, T. C. Memo. Op. June 13, 1945 (Prentice Hall, T. C. Memo. Dec.
194, U 45, 236); Clara B. Parker, Executrix, 31 B. T. A. 644 (1934); cf. Lawrence
Oliver, 4 T. C. 684 (1945)
" Cecil Gray, note 48 supra; J. Z. Todd, 3 T. C. 643 (1944) (remanded by C.
C. A. 9th (1945) in 153 F.(2d) 553; see J. Z. Todd, 7 T. C. '399); Clara B. Parker,
31 B. T. A. 644; Paul F. Hill et al., exec., 24 B. T. A. 1144 (1931)
o4 T. C. 684 (1945).
51153 F. (2d) 553 (1945).
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On remand 2 the Tax Court refused to depart from its original decision
applying G. C. M. 1030 rather than Califorma law. At the time of writing
this article, the ease is again before the Ninth Circuit on appeal from the
Tax Court.
The importance of the Todd case is not limited to California. Washington,
likewise, has a considerable stake in its outcome. The present Washington
law that all of the income from a business involving community services and
separate capital is community, unless segregated contemporaneously by the
spouses themselves, has likewise been ignored by the Tax Court. In Cecil
Gray,52 the comnussioner contended that substantially all of the income
after marriage from a separately owned brokerage business was separate
income. Taxpayer contended that under the applicable decisions of the Wash-
ington Supreme Court it was all community and as an alternative asked
that a computation under G. C. M. 1030 should be made. The Tax Court
declined to follow the Washington decisions and adopted the formula of
G. C. M. 1030.
If the Todd case is finally decided as indicated by the views of the majority
of the circuit court in the first hearing, it will appear that a method of
apportionment of income between community and separate property can be
adopted for federal tax purposes even though contrary to the laws and
decisions of the state.
To support this contention, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue relies
on the presumption of correctness attached to his determination of tax. The
taxpayer has the burden of proving the commissioner's determination in-
correct. The commissioner argues that the various state laws on the subject
here discussed do not fix ownership of income from a business involving
separate capital. The presumptions adopted by the states are, he says, merely
procedural methods of determination and do not establish ownership of
property so as to overcome the commissioner's determination.54 The Wash-
ington cases, for example, say that the question of whether the income is
community or separate is one of fact, and that where there is no clear way
to segregate the income it will be treated as commmgled and all be presumed
to be community property This is, it is argued, not a determination of owner-
ship of income but simply disposition of a case because of lack of proof.
If the matter is one of fact, not law, then the commissioner believes he can
5 J. Z. Todd, 7 T. C. 399.
58 See note 48 supra.
54 Nevertheless, where it was to his advantage, the commissioner has himself
relied on the State presumption. Estate of Emma Frye, 44 B. T. A. 835 (1941)
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require that taxpayer prove, the proper segregation in order to overcome the
commissioner's presumption of: correctness.
Tis theory was apparently adopted by the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit m Shea v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue55 in 1936.
Nevertheless, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly
taken precisely the opposite view in cases coming up from Texas and
Louisiana," stating that the presumption that commingled property is com-
munity is so bound together with local property rights that the failure to
apply it would result mserious interference with the local substantive law.5 7
And the Tax Court has held to the same effect in at least two cases, arising
from the State of Washmgton.58
One may expect, that the Ninth Circuit will take a definite position on
tls question in the Todd case. Should that be in accordance with the opinion
of the majority in the first Todd case and contrary to the Fifth Circuit
decisions, ground for -certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States
would exist to finally settle the question.59 From the taxpayer's side of the
question it can be contended that the Washington rule that no apportionment
will be made and the California method of apportionment adopted m the
Pereira case are, m effect, final rules of law determinmg status of property,
s!nce they apply only where there has been a commingling and thus no
factual segregation is possible. In reality, the state courts and the Tax Court
are trying to adopt different legal formulas as to ownership of property. The
question of segregation may be factual, as the courts have stated but where
there are no facts the solution must be by legal principle governing ownersip
of property.
MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS
In certain situations there are inherent facts on which a segregation may
8a 81 F. (2d) 937 (1936)
3"McFaddin v. Comm. (C. C. A. 5th, 1945), 148 F.(2d) 570; Howard v. U. S.(C. C. A. 5th, 1942), 125 F.(2d) 986; Stewart v. Comm. (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), 95
F. (2d) 821.
57Howard v. U..S., supra note 56.
asAustin Leigh Claiborne et at., ex'rs, 40 B. T. A. 722 (1939); Thomas W
Costello, T. C. Memo Dec., Jan. 27, 1945, fouiid in 1945 Prentice Hall;' T. C.
Memo Dec. 9.45034.
5It is possible that the commissioner's position will be upheld insofar as
suits for refund of tax in Federal District Courts are concerned, but denied as to
proceedings before the Tax Court. This is because on refund suits, the taxpayer
has the burden of proving the correct amount of tax, but before the Tax Court
all that the taxpayer must prove is that the assessment is arbitrary. Helvermg
v.. Taylor, 293 U. S. 507, 79 L. Ed. 623, 55 Sup. Ct. 287 (1935); Forbes v. Hassett,
124 F. (2d) 925 (C. C. A. 1st, 1942)
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be made and state and federal courts concur in segregating on the basis of
such facts. For example, if the spouse takes a salary from the business, this
has been treated as a contemporaneous segregation of the value of the serv-
ices, and the balance of the income is deemed separate.80 In recognizing con-
temporaneous segregation by the parties the Tax Court has gone so far as to
uphold an apportionment made in the income tax returns of the husband and
wife."'
Attention is called to the fact that the present discussion goes only to
unincorporated business-individual or partnerships. Where the husband or
wife at the time of marriage own stock in a corporation-even if a wholly
owned corporation to which the spouse devotes full time-the status of the
income may be determined by entirely different legal principles. Services of
the spouse to the corporation are presumably entirely paid by the salary
drawn from the corporation 82 and the separate status of the stock would
seem properly to make all dividends separate property However, in order to
do equity in hardship cases, the courts have, at times, given the community
an interest in the income from the corporation over and above the salary
paid. 8
If the federal courts finally approve the action of the Tax Court in apply-
ing the formula of G. C. M. 1030, it will be important that taxpayers, in
cases before the Tax Court or District Court, prove the factors necessary to
the application of this formula. This involves establishing the reasonable
value of the services of the spouse and the reasonable rate of interest on the
separate capital."4
Where income from a business involving separate capital is apportioned,
difficult problems are often faced in the treatment of withdrawals from the
00 Shea v. Comm., 81 F. (2d) 937 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936); Hugh B. Tinling, 7 T. C.
161 (1946), George W VanVorst, 7 T. C. 826 (1946), Anna L. Compton, exec, 11
B. T. A. 26; Julius Shafer, 2 B. T. A. 640; Zimmerman v. Squire, 57 F. Supp. 229
(W D. Wash. 1944); Van Camp v. Van Camp, 53 Cal. App. 17, 199 Pac. 885
.(1921) Contra: Rucker v. Blair, 32 F (2d) 222 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929)
Taxpayers will note from this that if it be desired that the community receive
a maximum amount of the income of an unincorporated business involving sep-
arate capital, the spouse should not receive an amount designated "salary" for
his services.
"
1Anna L. Compton, exec., 11 B. T. A. 26 (1928)
62 Gump v. Comm., 124 F (2d) 540 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941), In re Hebert's Estate,
169 Wash. 402, 14 P (2d) 6 (1932)
e In re Buchanan's Estate, 89 Wash. 172, 154 Pac. 129 (1916), Guy C. Earl, Jr.,
4 T. C. 768; G. A. Axelson, B. T. A. Memo Dec., April 7, 1942, found in Prentice
Hall, B. T. A. Memo Dec., 1942, 1! 42216.
1, F. A. Wilson, B. T. A. Memo Op., Feb. 6, 1943, found i Prentice Hall
1943 Tax Court Memo Dec., 1! 43085.
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business. Are these withdrawals to be charged to the community or separate
funds? The Supreme Court of Washington has quite uniformly held that
it is to be presumed that separate debts are paid from separate funds and
community debts from community funds. 5 On this point, in the case of Cecil
Gray,08 the Tax Court clearly erred, undoubtedly due to haste and inatten-
tion, in adding separate withdrawals to the separate capital rather than de-
creasing separate capital by the withdrawals made for separate purposes,
which would seem to be the correct rule as stated in the Washington. cases.
CONCLUSION
That difficult problems of segregation have resulted is not sufficient reason
to regret the action of Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico and Wash-
ington in abandoning the historical system of community property by depnv-
ing the community of the income from separate property Protection, primarily
for the wife and secondarily for the husband, in their separate property was
intended. This protection was deemed to be in the interests of public policy.
However, as this article shows it has not been fully achieved. It can be
achieved if solutions are found to the problem of segregation of community
and separate income which will give the benefits intended by the legislature
in making the change.
The Washington court, in refusing to make any segregation of income
arising from a business involving community services and separate capital,
fails to carry out the spirit of these sections of the Community Property Law.
In fact, the effect of the Washington rule in most cases is to put Washington
back on the historical system of community property where all income from
separate property belongs to the community, despite the legislative command
to the contrary And by saying that all income will be separate if the com-
munity services are small as compared to the separate capital, the Wash-
ington court has opened up the possibility of a husband working actively
and profitably for a lifetime without earning any community property, a
result certainly contrary to the intention of the legislature.
The California apportionment formula more closely approximates the
intent of the law but still it is subject to the charge of substantial inequity
Moreover, the cases holding that the services of a spouse in managing his or
her separate property, as distinguished from the conduct of an active busi-
ness, give rise to no community income whatever, bring about the same result
,5 'n re Finn's Estate, 106 Wash. 137, 179 Pae. 103 (1919); in re Binge's Estate,
5 Wn.(2d) 446, 105 P.(2d) 689 (1940); In re Woodburn's Estate, 190 Wash. 141,
66 P. (2d) 1138 (1937); Guye v. Guye, 63 Wash. 340, 115 Pac. 731, 37 L. R. A. (N. s.)
186 (1911)
"6 See note 48 supra.
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in California as is possible in Washington, viz. that the husband could work
actively and profitably for a lifetime without receiving any community
property. This result would seem entirely indefensible in light of the purposes
sought to be obtained by the community property system.
The closest approach to achieving the intent of the law yet suggested is
the apportionment formula of G. C. M. 1030, dividing the income according
to the ratio of reasonable interest on the separate capital to the reasonable
value of the community services. The state supreme courts mught well give
consideration to this formula.
No matter what the rule adopted, it is regrettable that these five states
with similar laws intended to produce the same results, have not worked out
a uniform method of treatment of this problem. But even though these state
courts pursue their own separate paths, there would seem to be no warrant
for the federal courts and the Bureau of Internal Revenue to disregard the
state law on the subject. These state rules whether or not called "presump-
tions" have become settled laws of property governing ownership of income
between the paties. They should be recognized for tax purposes just as the
community property system itself is recognized.
